The recent growth of concern around issues such as social biases implicit in algorithms, economic impacts of artificial intelligence (AI), or potential existential threats posed by the development of AI technology call for consideration of regulatory action to forestall or constrain certain developments in the fields of AI and machine learning. However, definitional ambiguity hampers the possibility of conversation about these urgent topics of public concern. Legal and regulatory interventions require agreed-upon definitions. However, consensus around a definition of AI has been elusive, especially in policy conversations. With an eye towards practical working definitions and a broader understanding of positions on these issues, we document variation in policy-maker and practitioner conceptions of AI, as well as their relation to hopes and concerns about AI. We execute a survey of AI practitioners, a review of definitions from the AI research literature, a review of existing AI-related policy documents, and an analysis of public commentary relating to AI from Twitter. We conclude from these data sources that, although there is substantial variation, many AI and machine learning researchers tend to favor definitions of AI that emphasize technical functionality while policy-makers favor definitions that emphasize comparison to human thinking and behavior. We point out that the technically-oriented definitions often employed by researchers better capture existing technologies that AI practitioners identify as being relevant to social harms that regulators aim to address.
Introduction
As computational systems have come to play an increasing role in making predictions about people, the downstream social consequences of artificial intelligence (AI) have garnered growing public attention. In the short term, evidence indicates that machine learning (ML) algorithms could contribute to oppression and discrimination due to historical legacies of injustice reflected in the training data [2, 7, 14] , or directly to economic inequality through job displacement [15] . In the long term, some believe AI technologies to pose an existential risk to humanity by altering the scope of human agency and self-determination [24] , or by the creation autonomous weapons [3] . For many researchers in machine learning, the answer to these challenges has been technical, and there has been a growth of work in fairness, accountability, and transparency in machine learning (e.g., [5, 21] ). For others, these challenges may require regulatory approaches. In the regulatory line, widespread public concerns regarding the social impacts of AI have led a growing number of organizations to create policy and ethical recommendations for AI governance [23] .
Here, we examine the regulatory approach and the extent to which current policy efforts are in meaningful conversation with existing AI and machine learning research. We begin with the simplest matter of definitions. Given that lawmakers are not prima facie technologists or AI experts, it is important to understand policymakers' operational definitions of AI on the path to effective governance choices. Policymakers' understanding of AI may differ from that of experts. For example, recent findings on municipal technology policy found that government employees did not think Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR) or Booking Photo Comparison Software, which rely on optical character recognition and facial recognition, are AI or machine learning systems [34] . Existing law and policy is applied to novel autonomous technologies with difficulty [18] , and attempts to pass new laws may be over-inclusive (for example, a law to govern autonomous vehicles in Nevada accidentally subjected cars with widely-deployed systems like cruise control to the same liability regime [8] ). Where policymakers do not have a clear definition of AI for regulatory purposes [19] , bureaucrats do not know which systems fall under new laws in the implementation phase.
A policy-facing definition of AI is one that facilitates policy implementation. In the wake of definitional ambiguity and misapprehension, policymakers concerned about the disparate impact of ML applications risk overlooking currently deployed technology in favor of next-generation systems. In the case of autonomous weapons, a major barrier to consensus in international discussions has been lack of agreement over the definition of an autonomous weapon [25] [12] . Furthermore, policymakers often use definitions of AI that are difficult to apply from the standpoint of policy implementation. For example, the AI4People Scientific Committee defines AI as "a resource [that] can hugely enhance human agency" [17] . As another example, the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems defines AI as "autonomous and intelligent technical systems [that] are specifically designed to reduce the necessity for human intervention in our day-to-day lives" [4] . These definitions are conceptually illuminating in that they highlight the role of humans in AI, but hard to apply because they are too broad to usefully apply in regulatory approaches to governance.
This lack of a policy-facing definition of AI, along with a possible disconnect between policymakers' and AI experts' conceptions of AI, motivate the current study. How do policymakers and AI experts conceptualize AI technologies? How may these conceptualizations differ? While previous work has hinted at answers to these questions, no systematic evaluation has been conducted. We employ a mixed methods social scientific approach to address these questions. Drawing upon on Russell and Norvig's typology of AI definitions [26] , we conduct a document analysis of policy documents in order to understand policymakers' understanding of AI. We also use this typology to analyze results from a survey of experts in AI to understand how experts define it, and to aggregate and analyze data from data sources. In our analyses, we validate and characterize a definitional disconnect between policymakers' and experts' conceptions of AI. We find that policy-makers tend to focus more on AI as imitating humans, either in their behavior or their thinking, while AI researchers tend to define AI more around technical function or qualities of algorithms used. We conclude by offering criteria for creating a policy-facing definition of AI.
Related Work
Researchers in AI have long recognized the lack of definitional consensus in the field. According to Agre [1] , the lack of a definition was generative: "Curiously, the lack of a precise, universally accepted definition of AI probably has helped the field to grow, blossom, and advance". Even as the field has disagreed widely in practice, in their foundational textbook, "Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach," Russell and Norvig [26] examine the goals of the field by considering how AI is defined in eight textbooks published between 1978-1993, finding that definitions can be classified into four primary approaches. Namely, AI as a field is concerned with building systems that (i) think like humans, (ii) act like humans, (iii) think rationally, and (iv) act rationally. Note that Russell and Norvig define rational as doing the right thing, and Sweeney [31] defines rational as behaving according to mathematical ideal behavior. However, according to Sweeney [31] , the lack of alignment between different conceptions of AI poses a risk to the field. In order to advance a critique that the term AI suffers from "too many different and sometimes conflicted meanings," Sweeney used this typology to characterize 996 AI research works cited in Russell and Norvig's textbook, based on her sense that a textbook cites works representative of or important to the field. Of these, nearly all (987) fell into one of the latter two approaches, i.e. to create artifacts that pursue rational (a.k.a. "ideal") thinking and behavior. At the same time, Sweeney notes large definitional shifts in the field over time, as well as low proportions of references common between textbooks published only a few years apart. Some definitional variation may proceed from expectations of AI that are relative to the current capabilities of computing. An early AI researcher remarked that "AI is a collective name for problems which we do not yet know how to solve properly by computer" [22] . According to John McCarthy, "As soon as it works, no one calls it AI anymore" [32] . Recent years have given rise to systematic inquiry into non-expert descriptions and understandings of AI. Awareness of AI is growing; Cave et al. [9] find that in a nationally representative survey in the United Kingdom, 85% of respondents had heard of AI. Among a subset of 622 people who provided a description of AI, 261 referred to computers performing tasks like "decision making," "learning," or "thinking." Another 155 respondents people described it as synonymous with robots. As the authors note, "This conflation is understandable...[but] could be problematic. Imagining AI as embodied will lend itself to some narratives more than others [such as] worries of gun-toting killer robots rather than the real-world risk of algorithmic bias [9] . Confirming this finding, other recent work to understand non-experts' primary concerns about AI has found that popular imaginaries focus on imagery from media [16] . A focus on humanoid AI contributes to misinformed public perception and "overshadow [s] issues that are already creating challenges today" [10] . In response to these challenges, scholars argue for changing the language used around AI to sharpen its conceptual clarity. Johnson and Verdicchio [20] identify two primary concerns with the public reception of expert discourse on AI. First, the concept of "autonomy" is misapprehended as machines possessing free will and self interest. Second, a discussion highlighting the "system" has elided the realities in which applications are embedded in sociotechnical systems with human actors. To address these concerns, the authors advocate for re-framing conversations around machine autonomy to foreground human actors and the broader sociotechnical context in which such systems are embedded. Other authors, such as Bryson [6] , have offered definitions that begin to synthesize these considerations with classical definitions of AI as idealized sensing-acting machines.
Methods
The aims of this study are twofold: To describe the way that AI experts and policymakers define AI, and to examine possible gaps between these definitions as they relate to implications for policymaking. We employed a multi-method social scientific approach.Our methodological motivation was complementary in combining different types of data [29] .
AI Practitioner Survey:
The survey was designed to understand AI experts' opinions regarding definitions of AI and views on the social impacts of AI. Participants first rated the extent to which they would classify a particular technology as AI. In choosing the particular technologies we presented, we drew on previous researchers' anecdotal identification of city stakeholders' different conceptions of certain surveillance technologies [34] . We chose four surveillance technologies drawn from this previous study, supplemented by a popular virtual assistant and a popular robot. We presented these technologies in randomized order. After these initial questions on classifying AI technologies, we then offered participants the option to define the term AI themselves. Finally, participants provided their opinions regarding particular social impacts of AI. Based on our understanding of the public discourse around AI, we focused on the harms of existential risk, economic inequality, and oppression and discrimination. We later used Twitter data to validate that these issues are of public concern. Images of all these stimuli are presented in our supplementary materials.
We used multiple recruitment methods for this survey. We advertised to two major international AI mailing lists, and sent recruitment emails to AI and ML mailing lists at four U.S. universities with strengths in AI and ML according to the U.S. News graduate ranking 1 and one university outside the U.S. We also publicized our survey on social media, although we ultimately excluded this data due to worries about selection bias. To control for sampling bias, we modified the survey URL to track which participants were recruited via which methods. In total, 756 people opened a survey link, and 357 participants completed the survey. 399 participants gave incomplete responses at the time of writing, and thus were not included in the final analyses. We further filtered out analysis to only include participants who used the links we provided from our mailing list and university samples. We finally subsampled our data to only include participants self-identifying as AI researchers or publishing in at least one of five AI/ML conferences we asked about (NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, IJCAI, or AAAI). This left a final sample size of 74 AI experts for our analyses. We collected demographic information to assess the representativeness of the data we analyzed from this survey.
Document Analysis of Policymakers:
In addition to the survey, we also analyzed policy documents in order to gather opinions from policymakers regarding AI. We drew upon a comprehensive inventory of available AI ethics and policy documents drawn primarily from the AI Ethics Guidelines Global Inventory 2 , which featured 66 documents published since 2017 at the time of this writing. The inventory contains documents authored by governments, non-governmental organizations, and firms with the goal of providing guidance on AI governance. Of these, we selected the first 29 policy-facing documents for further review. Seven of these documents offer no definition of artificial intelligence and four offer definitions only for machine learning or algorithms without making reference to AI more generally. The remaining eighteen documents contained responsive definitions of AI, defined as an explicit statement clarifying what is meant by AI specifically in terms of capabilities, functionality, or inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Definition Analysis Following Sweeney [31] , we classify definitions being used by practitioners and policy-makers according to Russell and Norvig's taxonomy [26] describing four general approaches to defining AI as a field pursuing: (i) machines that think like humans, (ii) machines that behave like humans, (iii) machines that think rationally (i.e. in terms of ideal behavior), and (iv) machines that behave rationally. For each of these categories, we coded the approach that was most pronounced in emphasis in the definition. Once sorted according to the typology, AI definitions were compared with definitions provided by survey respondents and definitions found in leading AI textbooks [31] .
Twitter Data: In three weeks of April-May 2019, we collected data from the social media site, Twitter, in order to confirm specific issues of concern to the general public regarding the downstream social consequences of AI. We collected 300 tweets related to AI by using the Twitter Streaming API to search for the keywords "AI" and "artificial intelligence". To inform our survey results, one author manually coded these tweets as related or not to existential risk, economic inequality, and oppression and discrimination. A second author validated a random sampling of these codes.
Results

AI Practitioner Survey
Expertise and Experience in our Sample Population: We first analyze the results of our survey of 74 AI practitioners. We start by confirming that our sample has the experience and expertise relevant to our research questions. Of the AI practitioner participants in our survey, all but one reported having at some point now or in the past considered themselves AI researchers. 68% reported having extensive experience in AI research or development, and 15% reported having some formal education or work experience relating to AI. 100% reported that they ever read academic publications/scholarly papers related to AI or machine learning. 22% reported having published at NeurIPS, 19% at ICML, 17% at AAAI, 13% at IJCAI, 7% at ICLR, and 23% at other conferences (including UAI, CVPR, AAMAS, ICRA, IROS, and "IEEE"). 78% reported that they considered any of their own work or projects as "very related" to the development of AI, while 18% reported their work or projects as only "somewhat related," and 4% as "a little related." Selection Bias in our Sample Population: To assess the representativeness of our biased sample, we checked the distribution of self-reported demographic variables. 26% reported female as their gender, 69% male, 1% entered their own gender identity, and 4% indicated they preferred not to say. Using categories based on the U.S. Census Bureau classification system, and allowing multiple selections, our subsample of AI practitioners report 0% identifying as American Indian or Alaska Native, 26% as Asian, 1% Black or African American, 3% Hispanic, 0% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 60% White, 4% entering their own race or ethnicity, and 6% indicating they preferred not to say. Authoritative statistics on the demographics of the fields of AI and machine learning were not readily available at the time of writing [33] but existing estimates place the percentage of women publishing in AI and ML at around 15-20%, with the percentage of women working in computing more broadly being last estimated as around 25%.
34 [33] Estimates of racial and ethnic diversity are less reliable but place the percentage of Black researchers in AI potentially as low as less than one percent, and only up to roughly 5% working in tech companies more broadly. One estimate places the percentage of Hispanic tech workers as around the same level. [33] We were not able to find counts of other racial or ethnic groups in the field of AI. Pew Report shows computer workers in the U.S. as White (65%), followed by Asian (19%), Black (7%) and Hispanic (7%). 5 According to these estimates, the demographics of our survey appear to be relatively representative of the community of AI researchers along these dimensions, which suggests, at least along these dimensions, the bias in our data from non-random sampling is small.
AI Practitioner Views of AI
We now analyze the explicit definitions of AI given by AI practitioners. In our survey, we asked an optional question for participants to offer their own definition of AI. 16 participants wrote in definitions. Two authors independently coded each definition according to Russell and Norvig's typology (described in Section 2) of human-imitating thinking (HT), human-imitating behavior (HB), ideal (rational) thinking (IT), and ideal behavior (IB). Initial agreement across the two codes was 50%, and the two coders came to consensus where there were disagreements. Figure 1 shows that AI practitioners tend to favor ideal thinking/behavior in their definitions of AI (69% used ideal). This result weakly replicates Sweeney's [31] analysis that found a 99% agreement on idealized thinking/behavior definitions in the published literature.
We also analyzed, of the 6 technologies we presented, which technologies participants rated as AI. The technologies we asked about were Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), binoculars, Booking Photo Comparison Software (BPCS), Forward-Looking Infrared camera (FLIR), Roomba, and Siri. We presented images and descriptions of these technologies to participants. Replications of these stimuli are available in the supplementary material. For each technology, we asked a question in the format of, "Please indicate your response to the following statement: ALPRs (Automated License Plate Readers) are an artificial intelligence (A.I.)-based technology." We presented a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree". Figure 2 shows that AI practitioners tend to agree that ALPRs (77% agree at least somewhat), BPCS (73%), and Siri (92%) are AI technologies, while binoculars and FLIR are not. There was disagreement about whether Roombas are AI technology, with only 57% classifying Roombas as AI.
Finally, we analyzed what social issues AI practitioners view to be relevant to AI. We asked about three issues: existential threats to humanity, economic inequality, and oppression and discrimination. The format of our questions was in the form "Please indicate your response to the following statement: The potential for an existential threat to humanity is a relevant issue to consider in the research and development of A.I. technologies." We used the same 7-point Likert scale as in our technology classification questions. Our results (included in our supplement) show that there is a large degree of agreement that economic inequality (81% agree) and oppression and discrimination (82% agree) are relevant issues. There was more disagreement about whether existential threats are relevant (45% agree). To tie the first and second parts of our survey together, we also asked a follow-up question to those participants who had rated any of the technologies we presented as AI and rated any of the issues we had presented as relevant: "Do any of the technologies you classified as A.I., or others that come to mind, relate to the issues you indicated were relevant to the topic of A.I.?" Figure 4 shows that substantial fractions of our sample considered Booking Photo Comparison Software and Siri to be relevant to oppression and discrimination, and a somewhat smaller fraction also considered those technologies to be relevant to economic inequality. Several AI practitioners also rated Automated License Plate Readers as related to these two issues.
Policy Document Analysis
Our primary finding from the policy document definitions is that they generally emphasized AI as pursuing human thought and behavior to a greater extent than practitioner definitions (59% of definitions given had this emphasis). For example, the Science and Technology Committee in the UK Parliament House of Commons defines AI as "a set of statistical tools and algorithms that combine to form, in part, intelligent software... to simulate elements of human behaviour such as learning, reasoning and classification" [27] . Other definitions mention that AI is "inspired by the human mind" [13] , "capable of learning from experience, much as people do" [30] , or "seek to simulate human traits" [28] . Several definitions emphasize the autonomous capabilities of these systems.
Notably, of the 29 documents we analyzed, 7 documents (24%), did not provide a definition of AI, yet issued policy recommendations about them. This finding affirms the need for a policy-facing Type Definition Source Human behavior Broadly, AI is "a set of statistical tools and algorithms that combine to form, in part, intelligent software" enabling "computers to simulate elements of human behaviour such as learning, reasoning and classification"
UK House of Commons
Human thought Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a term generally used to describe the simulation of elements of human intelligence processes by machines and computer systems.
Institute for Business Ethics
Ideal behavior Systems that display intelligent behaviour by analysing their,environment and taking actions -with some degree of autonomy -to,achieve specific goals.
EU Commission
Ideal thought AI is an intelligence created with intent though [sic] a process that is not biological evolution. The amount of intelligence is variable and defines a spectrum and has many subcomponents: learning/adaptation, decision making, explanation, self analysis.
AI Practitioner Survey Respondent definition of AI that would help adhere the growing number of guidance documents to technologies relevant to their implementation. In another case, policy guidelines from the AI Now Institute at New York University relied on Russel and Norvig's [26] typology of definitional approaches by way of a definition, defining AI as "systems that think like humans, systems that act like humans, systems that think rationally, systems that act rationally." Frequency of types encountered in our policy review appear in Figure 5 . Example definitions sorted into the typology are shown in Table 1 .
Twitter Data Analysis of AI Issues
Figure 5: Histogram of types of definitions found in AI policy documents. These documents favor humanimitating behavior/thinking definitions over ideal (rational) behavior/thinking. Codes as in Figure 1 with the addition of "NG" for None Given.
To confirm that the three issues we asked practitioners about in our survey are issues of public concern, we analyzed the Twitter data we collected. We found that out of the 300 tweets we collected, 172 or roughly 60% were actually related to artificial intelligence (compared to e.g. "Allen Iverson"). Among the 172 relevant tweets, 15% were related to at least one of the three issues, and around 5% were related to each of the three issues we identified (8 related to existential risk, 6 to economic inequality, and 7 related to oppression and discrimination). Given that around a total of 25% of the tweets were related to positive or neutral issues, such as modernization, this sample shows that there is significant public concern about these issues.
Discussion
The motivation of this research was to describe how AI experts and policymakers define AI, and to examine possible gaps between their definitions. Such a disconnect may lead to harmful and unintended consequences in the realm of policymaking. Public concern regarding issues such as economic inequality and existential risk call for policymakers to address these issues. The lack of a useful policy-facing definition of AI hampers the development of regulatory policies regarding these social impacts of AI.
In this study, we find that AI practitioners (experts) tend to favor ideal thinking/behavior in their definitions of AI. These findings build on prior work showing that practitioners are more likely to define AI in terms of "ideal behavior" [31] (Figure  1 ), despite definitional variation within the ML and AI practitioner community. Consistent with this tendency to define AI in terms of ideal thinking/behavior, AI practitioners also tend to agree on which technologies qualify as AI technologies, which fall under the classification of ideal behavior definitions (see Table 2 ). Furthermore, we find that AI practitioners generally agree that economic inequality and oppression and discrimination are relevant downstream social consequences of AI.
We also find that relative to ML and AI practitioners, policymakers tend to favor human thinking/behavior in their definitions of AI ( Figure 5 ). One possible consequence of this is that policymakers may overly focus on the future social consequences of AI. As noted by Cave et al., [9] [11], policymaker conceptions of humainoid AI may focus on the retreating horizon of systems still-to-be-created at the risk of passing over autonomous systems already in place.
To address this gap between policymakers' and AI practitioners' definitions of AI, and to practically address the social impacts of AI, we suggest using a definition that would maintain high fidelity to expert definitions of AI while better lending itself to policy implementation. First, a policy-facing definition ought to fit with existing scholarly work on AI, and thus with AI experts' conceptions of AI. Second, this definition should reflect the concerns of citizens. Such a definition should capture, rather than leave out, AI technologies of worry to the general public. This would also mean pulling back the AI conversation from future-focused issues to immediately pressing issues as well. Therefore, we propose the following necessary criteria for a policy-facing definition: (i) inclusivity of both currently deployed AI technologies and future applications, (ii) accessibility for non-expert audiences, and (iii) allowing for policy implementation of reporting and oversight procedures.
We conclude our analysis by offering an example of a recent policy-maker definition that does meet these criteria. The OECD offers the following definition: "An AI system is a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing real or virtual environments. AI systems are designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy." 6 This definition meshes well with those in scholarly work such as given by Russell and Norvig [26] and more recently by Bryson [6] that focus on AI as systems aimed at accomplishing a particular goal or set of goals that take input from a digital or physical environment and undertake goal-direction action on that information by responding to that input with a decision or other output. In line with our criteria, it is also specific enough that it includes existing technologies. For instance, a system like Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) makes recommendations that influence how police interact with their environment. Finally, also in line with our criteria, the OECD definition emphasizes that the goals of AI are human goals, and not intrinsic to the AI itself (C.f. [20] ).
Conclusion
Conversations about AI, including what it is and how it is affecting society, abound in the public arena, policy discussions, and technical research communities. In this paper, we highlight the difference between how AI experts -practitioners and technical researchers of AI -define AI technologies, and how policymakers -including organizations dedicated to the policy and ethics of AI -define AI technologies. Illustrating this definitional disconnect bridges a conversation between these two communities. While AI experts tend to define AI in terms of ideal thinking/behavior, policymakers tend to define AI in terms of human thinking/behavior. In light of this gap between AI experts' and policymakers' understanding of AI, we propose criteria for a working definition that aligns with AI research and public interests for the sake of effective policy implementation. Our thoughts are not meant to be the final word, but instead to engage the NeurIPS and machine learning community on this topic. Policy-makers look to us for new developments in AI and machine learning. We can leverage that attention and work to facilitate sensible AI policy by putting the thoughts of our own community on record in the publication venues we use. 
